In this paper, we will develop a class of logics for reasoning about qualitative and quantitative uncertainty. The semantics of the logics is uniformly based on possibility theory. Each logic in the class is parameterizedby a t-norm operation on 0,1], and we express the degree of implication between the possibilities of two formulas explicitly by using residuated implication with respect to the t-norm. The logics are then shown to be applicable to possibilistic reasoning, approximate reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.
Introduction
Knowledge representation and reasoning is fundamental to knowledge based systems. Due to the imprecision and incompleteness of acquired knowledge, uncertain reasoning is a key issue in knowledge representation. To accommodate different types of incomplete knowledge, many uncertainty reasoning methods have been proposed and extensively studied. Most methods focus exclusively on the quantitative or the qualitative aspects of uncertainty. The former includes probabilistic methods 2 , Dempster-Shafer theory 3 , possibilistic and fuzzy logics 4;5;6 , etc., while the latter includes rough set theory 7 , and various nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms 8;9 . Though focusing on a particular aspect of uncertain information is useful in the development of e cient reasoning algorithms, it is sometimes necessary to manage both types of uncertainty simultaneously. For example, we may want to summarize the numerical uncertain information in some qualitative words. On the other hand, it may be desirable to represent degrees of strength of defaults in nonmonotonic reasoning as some quantitative uncertainty.
In 10 , a logic based on conditional possibility(LCP) has been proposed to integrate some of the above-mentioned logics. However, since the semantics of LCP is based on the Dempster's conditioning rule 3 , it does not take into account some tnorm-based reasoning methods. For example, in 10 , it is shown that LCP can model similarity-based consequence relation only when the similarity relation is sup-min transitive.
In this paper, we will develop a class of alternative logics for reasoning about qualitative and quantitative uncertainty. The semantics of the logics is uniformly based on possibility theory. Each logic in the class is parameterized by a t-norm operation on 0,1], and we express the degree of implication between the possibilities of two formulas explicitly by using residuated implication with respect to the t-norm. The logics are then shown to be applicable to possibilistic reasoning, approximate reasoning, and default reasoning.
Possibilistic Residuated Implication Logics
In this section, we will introduce the possibilistic residuated implication logics (PRIL). The syntax of the logics is an extension of the classical propositional logic. The alphabet of the logics consists of a set of propositional symbols PV = fp; q; r; : ::g, the logical constants > (verum or truth constant) and ? (falsum or false constant), the classical connectives : (negation) and _ (or), and two classes of residuated implication operators, c =) and c + =) for all c 2 0; 1]. the formation rules of well-formed formulas(w s) for PRIL is as follows:
All propositional variables and propositional constants are w s, also called atomic formulas.
If f and g are w s and c 2 0; 1], so are :f, f _ g, f c =) g, and f c + =) g. Nothing except those determined by above are w s.
The usual abbreviations for classical logics are used, i.e., f^g = :(:f _ :g), f g = :f _ g, and (f g) = (f g)^(g f). We will use L to denote the subset of all classical w s.
The semantics of PRIL is based on possibility theory, so we review the theory rst. The t-norm (triangular norm) operations have been widely used in fuzzy set theory to de ne generalized intersection between fuzzy sets. Here, we use the notion of residuated implication with respect to a t-norm to de ne the degree of implication between the possibilities of two formulas. A binary operation : 0; 1] 0; 1] ! 0; 1] is a t-norm i it is associative, commutative, and increasing in both places, A possible world model for PRIL w.r.t. is then a triplet M = hW; R; V i, where W is a set of possible worlds, R W W is a binary fuzzy relation called accessibility relation on W, and V : PV ! 2 W assigns to each propositional symbol in PV a subset of W. Sometimes, we will also abuse the symbol V to denote a mapping from W to the set of classical interpretations such that for each w 2 W, V (w) : PV ! f0; 1g satis es V (w)(p) = 1 i w 2 V (p). For each w 2 W, a possibility distribution w can be de ned as w (u) = R(w; u) for all u 2 W. Let w denote the possibility measure corresponding to w for each w 2 W. Given a model M = hW; R; V i, we can de ne the truth relation as follows. For each world w and w f, let jfj = fw 2 W j w j = M fg and w (f) = w (jfj), and de ne (1) w j = M p , w 2 V (p); 8p 2 PV , (2) w j = M > and w 6 j = M ?, (3) 
Note that in the de nitions, every possible world may have di erent local possibility distribution and the residuated implication formulas are evaluated with respect to the local distributions. This is a main characteristic of our logic. The feature facilitates the interpretation of higher order (or nested) uncertain beliefs in the possibilistic reasoning framework.
A formula f is satis able i there exists M and w such that w j = M f, and is valid in M i w j = M f for all w 2 W. The subscript M will be dropped when it is clear from the context. We use M j = f to denote f is valid in M and M j = S to mean M j = f for all f 2 S. Let S be a set of w s, then S j = f i for all models M w.r.t. , if M j = S implies M j = f.
A comparison with LCP
In 10 , a logic for conditional possibility(LCP) is introduced which can be seen as a precedent of PRIL. In LCP, two kinds of graded conditional connectives For the semantics, the Dempster's rule 3 is used to de ne the conditional possibility. According to the rule, if is a possibility distribution and is its corresponding possibility measure, then the conditional possibility distribution on a subset of the universe A (xjA) = ?! g are respectively equivalent to f c =) f^g and f c + =) f^g when the t-norm is the algebraic product. Thus, PRIL can do all reasoning that LCP can do. However, PRIL is more exible since it is parameterized by a t-norm and not restricted to the family of algebraic product.
Possibilistic Reasoning
We can do possibilistic reasoning in PRIL by considering a special subclass of models. A model M = hW; R; V i is called serial if R satis es the condition that for all w 2 W, sup u2W R(w; u) = 1, i.e., w is normalized for all w. We will write S j = (D) f if for all serial models M w.r.t. , M j = S implies M j = f y .
y We will adopt the naming convention in modal logics 12 for systems of PRIL. in modal logics 12 . Furthermore, by the semantic clauses (5) and (6), we have On the other hand, if (S) 6 j = (D) (f), then we have a model M = hW; R; V i such that M j = (S) and a w 2 W such that w 6 j = M (f). Recall the de nition of w from R, we can de ne : ! 0; 1] as follows (x) = supf w (u)jV (u) = xg: Note here we abuse V as an assignment function so that V (u) is a classical interpretation. That is, we take w as the base of , however, since w is a possibility distribution on W and there may be two di erent possible worlds in W with the same classical interpretation being assigned to them, we must take the supremum when it is changed into one on . From the de nition, we can show that j = S but 6 j = f by the restriction that all w s in (S) and (f) are all of the forms c]g or hcig for some classical w g. 2
Note that the expressive power of PRIL is strictly more general than that of possibilistic logic. For example, we may want to represent the following sentence about a re ective agent:
The agent consider it completely possible that what he believes with half certainty is wrong.
The sentence can be represented as h1i ( 1 2 ]p^:p), however it is not in the range of L . Moreover, we emphasize again that the local possibility distributions associated with each world in the semantics make the interpretation of such sentences possible by noticing that if w = for all w 2 W, then the sentence is unsatis able.
From the proof above, we also note that the notion of possible worlds is different from that of classical interpretations. Indeed, a classical interpretation is an important component of a possible world by the truth assignment function V . However, a possible world contains more. Two possible worlds u and v may have the same classical truth assignment, i.e. V (u) = V (v), but have di erent distributions associated with them, i.e. u 6 = v , and they may be assigned di erent possibility degrees by another world w, i.e. w (u) 6 = w (v). The preceding theorem and its proof show that the di erence is irrelevant when only rst-degree modal formulas are considered. However, when nested modality is involved, we can not identify possible worlds with classical interpretations any more. To see this, suppose that L is a nite propositional language, then for any classical interpretation !, the characteristic formula of ! is de ned as
:p:
If we require that for any PRIL model M = hW; R; V i, V (w 1 ) 6 = V (w 2 ) when w 1 6 = w 2 , then the w h1i( !^ 1]p)^h1i( !^h 1i:p) is unsatis able whereas it is satis able in PRIL if such requirement on models is not made.
While possibilistic logic and QML reason about the quantitative measures directly, a logic for reasoning about comparative possibility has been proposed 15 . The logic is called qualitative possibility logic(QPL). Let us use the following abbreviation f g = f 1 =) g; then we have
Let L denote the subset of w s composed only from the classical connectives and , then L is exactly the set of QPL w s. Furthermore, a QPL model is just a serial PRIL model with the QPL w s being interpreted by clauses (1)- (4) and (11). Then, the following result holds obviously.
Theorem 3 Let S ffg L , then S j = (D) f i S j = QPL f, where j = QPL is the logical consequence relation of QPL de ned as usual.
Similarity-based Reasoning
A fuzzy relation R on X is called a similarity relation if it satis es the following properties:
1. Re exivity: R(x; x) = 1 for all x 2 X. 2. Symmetry: R(x; y) = R(y; x) for all x; y 2 X. 3. -transitivity: R(x; y) R(y; z) R(x; z) for all x; y; x 2 X.
The reasoning based on similarity relation is rst proposed by Ruspini 16 . Given a similarity R on the set of classical interpretations, he de nes the implication and consistency measures between two w s f; g 2 L as I R (gjf) = inf
Based on the two measures, Esteva et al. 14 recently propose a graded modal logic MS5(G; ) for similarity-based reasoning. The set G is a denumerable subset of 0; 1] such that 0; 1 2 G. The set of w s for MS5(G; ) is identical to that of QML, though they use 3 c and 3 o instead of h i and h i + for the graded modal operators and restrict that 2 G. The semantics of MS5(G; ) is based on similarity Kripke models. A similarity Kripke model M = hW; R; V i is essentially a PRIL (or QML) model with R being a (G; )-similarity relation, i.e. R : W W ! G satisfying re exivity, symmetry, and -transitivity. An axiomatic system for MS5(G; ) is given and shown to be sound with respect to the semantics in 14 . They also show the completeness of an expanded system MS5 + (G; ) when G is nite and that of another system MS5 ++ (G; min) when =min. Since PRIL is a more general framework, all reasoning made in MS5(G; ) and its expansions can be simulated in PRIL. Of course, the simulated reasoning is basically at the semantic level since we do not have a complete axiomatization for PRIL yet. This is still an open problem for the further research, however, we will give a tentative set of axioms below.
Among the axioms and theorems of MS5(G; ), some modal w s characterizing properties of similarity relations are especially interesting. Here, we will present some of them and discuss their intuitive meaning. Intuitively, w j = hcif means that the world w is similar to the f-worlds at least to the extent c (or in short, w is c-similar to f-worlds). Dually, w j = c]f means w is discernible with :f-worlds to the extent c or w is c-characterized by f. Let j = (S5) denote the logical consequence relation w.r.t. all PRIL models hW; R; V i such that R is a similarity relation on W. Then the following three characteristic axioms are valid. First, the schema T j = (S5) f h1if
says that a world satisfying f is completely similar to f-worlds. This re ects the re exivity. Second, the schema 4 j = (S5) hcihdif hc dif corresponds to transitivity, that says a world c-similar to worlds d-similar to fworlds is itself c d-similar to f-worlds. Finally, the schema B for symmetry j = (S5) f c]h1 ? ci + f means that if a world satis es f, then we can c-discernible it from those worlds that are not (1?c)-similar to f-worlds. Putting it in more qualitative terms, this means that if f is true in a world, then it is strongly discernible from those worlds only little similar to f-worlds. The MS5(G; ) logic does similarity-based reasoning mainly by a set of unary modal operators. However, to express a kind of conditional implication measure when G is not nite, Esteva et al. 14 . Although the consequence relations given above are de ned with respect to a similarity relation, in general, it is di cult to have a complete speci cation of a similarity relation, so it is sometimes unrealistic to do similarity-based approximate reasoning for a particular similarity relation. However, by using the object level logics, we can de ne more realistic consequence relations in PRIL.
De nition 1 Let K L, f; g 2 L, and c 2 0; 1], then 1. f j K;c 1 g i K j = (S5) f hcig, 2. f j K;c 2 g i K j = (S5) f c =) g, and
Note that by using j = (S5) , we consider not only the similarity relations on but also any PRIL models where W may be any subset of possible worlds. The remark after Theorem 2 have emphasized the di erence between possible worlds and classical interpretations when nested modal w s are involved. Since nested modal formulas are essential to the system MS5(G; ) (or (S5)), the di erence can not be overlook. Moreover, the use of nested modal formulas in (S5) also shows that it is not merely a technical generalization.
The discussion until now is mainly semantic. We have shown that PRIL is a general framework that can do possibilistic and similarity-based reasoning from the semantic viewpoint. However, to apply the logic to real problem, we would like to develop some reasoning mechanism for it. The rst step will be an axiomatic system. However, unfortunately, we can not nd a completeness proof for it yet. Instead of conjecturing a complete axiomatization, we present a tentative set of axioms and inference rules for PRIL. This axiomatization is inspired by the characteristic properties of the three types of consequence relations mentioned above 17;18 . (Also compare it with the axiomatic system for LCP in 10 The PRIL system can be easily applied to interpolative reasoning. Here, let us use an example from 17 to illustrate the similarity-based reasoning in PRIL.
Example 1 If X and Y are two variables on domain U and V respectively, and we have rules of the form if X is in A, then Y is in B, where A and B are subsets of U and V respectively. Then the rule can be encoded into a PRIL formula p 1 =) q, where p and q denote \X is in A" and \Y is in B" respectively. More generally, if the rule is uncertain, then it can be encoded as p c =) q with c < 1. Now, if it is known that X = u 0 6 2 A and we have a similarity relation S on the domain U. Then we can get the information hdip, where d = sup x2A S(u 0 ; x). Then by applying -transitivity axiom and propositional reasoning, we can conclude hc diq, i.e. Y is close to a point in B to the degree of c d. 2 
Default Reasoning
We will consider another subclass of models in this section. A model hW; R; V i is called absolute if there exists a normalized possibility distribution on W such that R(w; u) = (u) for all w; u 2 W. In other word, all w 's induced from R are the same. For two absolute models M 1 = hW 1 ; R 1 ; V 1 i and M 2 = hW 2 ; R 2 ; V 2 i, M 1 is said to be more speci c than M 2 , written as M 1 v M 2 , if for all w 1 2 W 1 there exists w 2 2 W 2 such that V 1 (w 1 ) = V 2 (w 2 ) and 1 (w 1 ) 2 (w 2 ), where i is the possibility distribution corresponding to R i for i = 1; 2. We will denote an absolute model as hW; ; V i from now on.
To represent a default, let us use the following abbreviation, for all 1 i n. Note that since we restrict c > 0 and is strictly monotonic, we have (f i^: g i ) < (f i^gi ) from (2) . This is just the traditional interpretation of qualitative default rule in the possibilistic reasoning setting 19;20 . This may also suggest an alternative way to encode f c ?! g as :( (f^g) (1?c) =) (f^:g)). Then (2) is replaced by (f i^: g i ) < (1 ? c i ) (f i^gi ) (3) and the restriction on c can be relaxed. However, the new set of inequalities does not have a least speci c solution, so we can not de ne default reasoning based on the principle of minimum speci city if we adopt the alternative de nition.
Let denote the set of all propositional interpretations for L and be satisable, then we can de ne a possibility distribution + on as follows. Intuitively, + is the least speci c solution to (2).
De nition 2 + (!) = 1 if for each i, ! 6 j = f i^: g i and otherwise,
Though it seems that the de nition is circular, it can in fact be computed in an iterative way. The procedure in Fig. 1. realizes Now, according to the computation of procedure C-rank, + is indeed the least speci c solution of (2)(see also the proof of theorem 7), so the lemma follows directly from these two facts. 2 This lemma also shows that we can identify a set of possible worlds with the set of classical interpretations when only v-maximal absolute models are considered.
In other words, we can consider the absolute PRIL models with the set of classical interpretations as possible worlds without loss of generality since the default rule is represented by a rst-degree modal formula and no nested modalities are involved. Thus, though we emphasize the di erence between classical interpretations and general possible worlds in the last two sections when nested modal formulas are used in possibilistic and similarity-based reasoning, the distinction can be eliminated in the context of default reasoning represented by rst-degree PRIL formulas.
Let S j = v f denote that f is valid in all v-maximal absolute models satisfying S. Then, we have When is the numerical product, j = v is equivalent to 1-entailment of Goldszmidt and Pearl's system Z +21 , so PRIL indeed provides a general framework for default reasoning with degrees of strength. The procedures in 21 can then be modi ed to provide an e ective way to decide j = v relation in PRIL. We now present the procedures in Fig. 1 and 2 .
In the procedures, we use the following notations. Given a w r = f c ?! g 2 L , de ne V (r) = ff^gg, F(r) = ff^:gg, and S(r) = ff gg. Let L , then V ( ) = S r2 V (r), F( ) = S r2 F(r), and S( ) = S r2 S(r). Let S L, then SAT-TEST(S) returns TRUE i S is classical satis able.
It can be shown that the two procedures are correct.
Theorem 7 1. The outputs of C-rank procedure are C + (r i )(1 i n) de ned in Def. 2.
2. The output of C + -consequence procedure is \TRUE" i j = v f c ?! g. Proof:
1. We prove the following is a loop invariant with respect to the while-loop in the C-rank procedure: for any possibility measure . However, according to (2) and the strict monotonicity of , if is a solution of (2), then we have (F(r)) < (V (r)) for all r 2 , so (F(r) )), so + is not a solution of (2) . This contradicts with the fact that + is the least speci c solution of (2) .
From the third and the fourth results, it immediately follows that (6) Moreover, by the de nition of 0 and ! and the condition in step 4.4, the cardinality of 1 at lease increases 1 for each iteration step, so the procedure will terminate since is nite. ( 1 )) is true, then there exists ! j = f^g such that ! 6 j = F(r) for all r 2 1 , so + (f^g) + (!) > max ri2 1 C + i . The last inequality holds because + (!) is not constrained by rules in 1 . This implies + (f^g) x. On the other hand, if c 1 = 0, it means that SAT-TEST(ff^gg S( 1 fr i j C + i = xg)) is false, so for all !, if ! j = f^g, then ! j = F(r) for some r 2 1 fr i j C + i = xg. Thus, for all !, if ! j = f^g, then + (!) x, so + (f^g) = x. Therefore, after the assignment in step 2., c 1 = + (f^g). Analogously, after step 3., we have c 2 = + (f^:g), so by theorem 6, the result follows. 2
If SAT-TEST(ff^gg S
To illustrate the procedures, let us consider a familiar default reasoning example from 21 . Running the C-rank procedure step by step will produce the following results 
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we propose a class of uncertainty logics parameterized by t-norm operations called PRIL. The semantics of the logics is based on possibility theory and a residuated implication between possibilities of two w s is de ned according to the given t-norm.
When we restrict the semantics to serial models, we can simulate possibilistic reasoning in PRIL, and it is shown that the syntax of PRIL is more general than that of possibilistic logic.
When considering similarity models, we can model three types of meta-level graded consequence relations. It is also shown that the syntax of PRIL facilitates the representation of some characteristic axioms for similarity that are not expressible as mete-level construct.
Finally, we show that when the t-norm is continuous and strictly monotonic, the logics can do default reasoning with degrees of strength by using absolute models.
Related works
To extend the perspective of the current paper, we would like to discuss some related works z brie y in the nal section.
First, in 22 , a Kripke structure is de ned as ( ; R), where is the set of all classical interpretations and R is a fuzzy binary relation on . Then four classes of Kripke structures with the relation R being respectively re exive, -similarity, seperating -similarity x , and serial and their corresponding logical consequence relations are compared. As we can see here, serial models correspond to possibilistic reasoning, while the other three types of models all belong to the similarity-based reasoning domain, so the results in 22 present a clear relationship between these two kinds of reassoning. Moreover, they distinguish the local and global logical consequence de ned with respect to a class of models. Essentially, global logical consequence is the one we use in this paper, while the local one is de ned by S j = l f i for all models M = ( ; R) and ! 2 , ! j = M S implies ! j = M f. When S is a nite set of w s, the local logical consequence S j = l f corresponds to the global validity of the w V S f. However, when S is in nite, the local logical consequence is in general weaker than the global one. This has been observed in the classical modal logic systems 23 . The results in 22 extend the observation to the graded modal logics for possibilistic and similarity-based reasoning. Second, while PRIL and all related logics introduced so far are based on the generalization of Kripke semantics for modal logics, and so they are non-truthfunctional, a truth-functional semantics for possibilistic logic has been proposed recently 24;25 . Their logic is called local possibilistic logic (LPL). The language of LPL is composed from atomic proposition and a set of constant fc j c 2 0; 1]g z We thank two anonymous refrees for directing our attention to these interesting works and kindly sending us the reference 22 . x A binary relation R is called seperating if R(x; y) 6 = 1 for all x 6 = y. by ordinary Boolean connectives and two additional binary connectives and ! corresponding to t-norm and its residuated implication. The crucial part of LPL is that it adopts dynamic semantics 26 instead of the traditional static view of Tarskian semantics. According to the dynamic view, each formula is interpreted as an information state instead of a truth value in f0; 1g or 0; 1], where an information state is a (possibly unnormalized) possibility distribution on the set of all classical interpretations, and the logical connectives correspond to di erent types of information aggregations (like conjunction, disjunction, and fusion). Each information state can be seen as an agent's epistemic state and the meaning of a w depends on how it change the agent's epistemic state. As noted in the preceding sections, the LPL can not represent nested modalities since it use possibility distributions on the classical interpretations instead of a binary relation on possible worlds. However, this is just suitable for possibilistic reasoning, though it can not cover the similarity-based reasoning. The class of all possibility distributions on classical interpretations with the operations corresponding to LPL connectives forms a complete lattice and commutative monoid with unit. To nd the corresponding algebraic structure for our semantics, we must x some model in advance, then the truth set of each w under the model can be seen as an element of a modal algebra 27 . A complete Gentzen-style system for LPL has been provided and its relationship with substructural logics 28 is emphasized. From a practical viewpoint, the LPL is applicable to the data fusion problem. The exploration along this direction has been made in 29 .
